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A B S T R A C T
The 2017 Grenfell Tower ﬁre spread rapidly around the combustible façade system on the outside of the
building, killing 72 people. We used a range of micro- and bench-scale methods to understand the ﬁre behaviour
of diﬀerent types of façade product, including those used on the Tower, in order to explain the speed, ferocity
and lethality of the ﬁre. Compared to the least ﬂammable panels, polyethylene-aluminium composites showed
55x greater peak heat release rates (pHRR) and 70x greater total heat release (THR), while widely-used high-
pressure laminate panels showed 25x greater pHRR and 115x greater THR. Compared to the least combustible
insulation products, polyisocyanurate foam showed 16x greater pHRR and 35x greater THR, while phenolic
foam showed 9x greater pHRR and 48x greater THR. A few burning drips of polyethylene from the panelling are
enough to ignite the foam insulation, providing a novel explanation for rapid ﬂame-spread within the facade.
Smoke from polyisocyanurates was 15x, and phenolics 5x more toxic than from mineral wool insulation. 1 kg of
burning polyisocyanurate insulation is suﬃcient to ﬁll a 50m3 room with an incapacitating and ultimately lethal
eﬄuent. Simple, additive models are proposed, which provide the same rank order as BS8414 large-scale reg-
ulatory tests.
1. Introduction
In 2006, restrictions on the use of combustible materials on the
outside of tall buildings in the UK were relaxed, while targets for energy
eﬃciency were raised. In 2016, the Grenfell Tower was refurbished
with an insulated rainscreen façade system consisting of combustible
polyisocyanurate (PIR) foam insulation and aluminium-polyethylene
composite material, separated by a ventilated cavity (Fig. 1) covering
the exterior of the building. On 14th June 2017, a ﬁre, reported to have
started in a fridge-freezer in a fourth ﬂoor apartment, broke out to ig-
nite the recently installed façade system, after which it spread very
rapidly around the outside of the building, and into almost all the other
apartments, ultimately killing 72 occupants. The diﬀerent components
of the façade system were certiﬁed to have passed regulatory tests for
ﬁre safety, although it is arguable whether the refurbished façade
system was actually compliant. The background to the ﬁre and the
regulatory regime for ﬁre safety of tall buildings is detailed in the
supplementary material (SM).
In addition to rapid ﬁre spread around the Tower, large volumes of
smoke were produced. Smoke inhalation is known to be the largest
cause of death and the largest cause of injury from ﬁre in the UK and US
[1,2]. In most cases the smoke from the burning façade appears to have
entered the building before the contents of each apartment ignited, so
the smoke toxicity of the façade is an important factor in the tragedy.
On exposure to smoke, the victim becomes incapacitated (unconscious),
and unless they are rescued, death is likely to follow. Incapacitation and
lethality may be estimated for 50% of an exposed population in terms of
a fractional eﬀective dose (FED), following ISO 13571 [3] (in-
capacitation) or ISO 13344 [4] (lethality). When the FED equals 1, the
equations predict that half of the exposed population would be in-
capacitated or killed. Fire safety engineers may use a precautionary
factor of 10 (i.e. FED < 0.1) to ensure the life safety of occupants in the
event of ﬁre.
Fire toxicity is a function of both material and ﬁre condition. It has
been shown that the yield of major asphyxiants hydrogen cyanide
(HCN) and carbon monoxide (CO) increases by a factor of 5 to 20 as the
ﬁre grows from well-ventilated to under-ventilated [5]. The steady state
tube furnace (ISO TS 19700) [6] has been speciﬁcally designed to re-
plicate the smoke toxicity of individual ﬁre stages [7]. The ventilation
condition of burning polyethene (PE), pouring out of the aluminium
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composite material (ACM) screens is uncertain, while the insulation
foams behind the ACM will have undergone the more toxic under-
ventilated burning. Woolley and Raftery reported the increasing danger
of smoke toxicity over 40 years ago [8], speciﬁcally highlighting the
release of HCN from rigid and ﬂexible urethane foams. It has been
shown that when PIR foam burns it generates HCN and CO in dangerous
quantities [9]. Investigation reports have shown that almost all of the
Grenfell Tower occupants who died in the building collapsed because
the fumes prevented escape [10]. Several survivors were treated for
cyanide poisoning, and many victims had collapsed on the stairs.
The refurbishment of tall concrete buildings often involves covering
the exterior with a rainscreen facade system, consisting of an outer-
screen, a cavity and an inner layer of insulation. The outer-screen may
be aluminium composite material (ACM), high-pressure laminate
(HPL), or mineral ﬁbre board. ACM consists of two thin sheets of alu-
minium (˜ 0.5 mm) sandwiching a layer of polymer (usually PE), PE
ﬁlled with metal hydroxide ﬁre retardant (FR), or predominantly non-
combustible (NC), as inorganic composite or metallic ﬁlling. FR panels
contain around 65% aluminium hydroxide or magnesium hydroxide,
having a ﬁre retarding eﬀect through endothermic dehydration and the
subsequent release of water, to suppress ﬂaming [11].
At the time of the ﬁre, two phenolic foams (PF) and one PIR foam
were certiﬁed to be compliant with the UK building regulations for tall
building exteriors. The certiﬁcates for the PIR foam and one phenolic
foam have subsequently been withdrawn by their manufacturers. In this
study, various outer-screens, and the certiﬁed insulation foams, were
tested alongside other phenolic and PIR foams and two non-combus-
tible insulation boards, of glass wool (GW) and stone wool (SW).
The aim of this paper was to assess the ﬁre safety of combinations of
typical rainscreen façade products using micro-scale decomposition and
bench-scale ﬁre behaviour and toxic product evolution. The results are
related to the large-scale government tests [12], following the Grenfell
ﬁre, on 8m rainscreen façade systems.
2. Experimental
Commercial products designed for use in façade systems and the
subject of this study are shown in Tables 1 and 2. They were analysed to
determine their composition, thermal decomposition and ﬁre beha-
viour. ACM_PE1, PF2 and PIR2 are reported to have been used ex-
tensively on the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. Other products have
been selected to illustrate the range of diﬀerent ﬁre performance from
diﬀerent materials. The PIR2 product is unusual in that it has thin
layers of glass wool sandwiched between thick (˜25mm) layers of PIR
foam.
For the ACM products, the aluminium sheets were removed in order
to investigate the composition and micro-scale thermal decomposition
of the ﬁlling material.
2.1. Elemental analysis
Outer-screen products, ﬁllings for ACM products, and insulation
boards were subject to elemental analysis using CHNS (Thermo
Scientiﬁc Flash 2000 Organic Elemental Analyser), SEM-EDAX (FEI
Quanta 200), and X-Ray ﬂuorescence (Bruker Trace IV-SD handheld
XRF) at 25 keV.
2.2. Polymer characterisation
The polymeric ﬁlling of the ACM_PE, ACM_FR and ACM_NC samples
were characterised by diamond-attenuated total reﬂectance-FTIR
spectrophotometry using a Nicolet IS 5 FTIR.
2.3. Thermal analysis
Samples of around 10mg were subjected to thermogravimetric
analysis (TGA) in air and nitrogen in a Stanton Redcroft STA 780, and
diﬀerential scanning calorimetry (DSC) in a TA Instruments 2920, all at
a heating rate of 10 °C min−1.
2.4. Bomb calorimetry
The gross heat of combustion was measured in an oxygen bomb
calorimeter (Parr 6200) according to ISO 1716:2002, running 2 re-
plicate tests for each sample.
Fig. 1. Façade system in the Grenfell Tower.
Table 1
Panel Materials.
Code Filling Density
(kg m−3)
Thickness
(mm)
ACM_PE1 PE 1400 (950*) 4
ACM_PE2 PE 1375 (925*) 4
ACM_FR1 PE with FR 1900
(1625*)
4
ACM_FR2 PE with FR 1900
(1650*)
4
ACM_FR3 PE with FR 1900
(1600*)
4
ACM_NC1 Mineral ﬁlled 1900
(1625*)
4
ACM_NC2 Corrugated aluminium 1100 4
HPL_PF High pressure laminate (phenol
formaldehyde)
1350 10
HPL_FR High pressure
laminate (phenol formaldehyde FR)
1350 8
MWB_1 Mineral wool board 1200 8
MWB_2 Mineral wool board 1250 9
* Measured density of ﬁller material excluding aluminium.
Table 2
Insulation Materials.
Code Description Density
(kg m−3)
PF1 Phenolic foam 42.8
PF2 Phenolic foam 41.8
PF3 Phenolic foam 45.0
PIR1 PIR foam 32.4
PIR2 PIR foam 35.0
PIR3 PIR foam 35.0
SW Stone wool 37.0 (78.0)*
GW Glass Wool 36.0
* Value reported is of lower density (insulating) layer, value in brackets is
density of higher density external facing layer.
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2.5. Microscale combustion calorimetry
Samples of around 2–3mg were decomposed under pyrolysis and
oxidative conditions (Method A and B in ASTM D7309 respectively)
[13].
2.6. Cone calorimetry
All samples were tested at an applied heat ﬂux of 50 kW m−2, fol-
lowing ISO 5660 [14]. In order to investigate the burning behaviour of
panel materials covered on both sides with 0.5mm aluminium sheet, a
novel methodology was devised, allowing the combustible contents to
be ignited, while still testing a section of the whole panel. Outer-screen
products of 70×70 mm2, were placed centrally with the painted side
uppermost in the 100×100mm2 sample holder. However, the results
have been re-scaled so they are presented in kW m−2. ACM products
were tested complete with the aluminium sheets. The insulation ma-
terials were tested as blocks of 20×100×100mm3 cut from the
larger boards, without the external aluminium foil facing. All samples
were tested without the upper retaining frame. Where foam samples
showed signiﬁcant distortion, they were held in place using a wire grill
speciﬁed in ISO 5660.
2.7. Smoke toxicity
The smoke toxicity of the insulation materials was determined using
the steady state tube furnace (SSTF), following ISO TS 19700 [6] under
the three ﬂaming ﬁre conditions described in ISO 19706 [7]: well-
ventilated (stage 2); small under-ventilated (3a); and large under-ven-
tilated (3b).
3. Results
3.1. Microscale decomposition
In the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower ﬁre, the UK
government were advised to commission a series of initial screening
tests on the combustibility of ACM ﬁlling samples taken from high-rise
buildings [15] using bomb calorimetry. A summary of the ﬁndings from
this screening is presented in the discussion. The heats of combustion of
all products were measured using bomb calorimetry and microscale
combustion calorimetry (MCC). The thermal decomposition in air and
nitrogen was investigated for all ACM ﬁlling materials, outer-screen and
insulation products. The data and commentary appears in SM.
3.1.1. Bomb calorimetry and microscale combustion calorimetry (Method
B)
Table 3 shows the heat of combustion of each façade product or its
ﬁlling (for ACM) determined by bomb calorimetry and MCC method B.
The results show good agreement with the UK government data [12]
and reasonable agreement between the bomb calorimeter and MCC
method B, for the panel materials, discussed further in SM. The results
show the very large contribution to heat release during combustion
(measured by either method) from PE ﬁlled ACM and the signiﬁcant
reduction of adding 60% or more ﬁller. The results also show the sig-
niﬁcant heat release of the plastic foam insulation per unit mass. The
data are used to estimate the relative contributions to façade ﬁres.
3.1.2. Microscale combustion calorimetry (Method a)
The rate of heat release following anaerobic pyrolysis of the panel
ﬁllings is shown in Fig. 2, with a peak of heat release under pyrolysis
conditions for all ACM ﬁller materials just below 500 °C. Method A is
considered to be more representative of ﬁre behaviour [16], as there is
no oxygen between the ﬂame and the fuel. The large and sharp peak of
the PE ﬁlling is very signiﬁcant, both to this work, and the Grenfell
Tower ﬁre. The total heat release is the area under each curve, and the
peak is the pyrolysis temperature. For ACM, it shows the contribution
diﬀerent ﬁller loadings make to the heat release rate, and that the peak
decomposition temperature of the polymeric fuel is always close to
500 °C, except for the HPL products (HPL_PF, 350 °C and HPL_FR,
290 °C).
Fig. 3 shows very diﬀerent rate of heat release data for the insula-
tion, with much more gradual heat release occurring over the full
temperature range (70 to 700 °C), compared to the outer-screen mate-
rials, and distinct peaks at 300 to 400 °C for PIR foams and at 500 °C for
phenolic foams. The steady low heat release from the binders of the
stone and glass wool show clear diﬀerences between these products and
the foams.
3.2. Bench-Scale burning behaviour
3.2.1. Panel products
The novel methodology for testing sections of panel proved eﬀective
in assessing their contribution to the façade’s ﬂammability. The heat
release rate (HRR) in cone calorimetry (Fig. 4) shows notable diﬀer-
ences in combustibility of the diﬀerent panels. All of the panel materials
ignited in the cone calorimeter, although this only appeared to involve
Table 3
Heat release of façade materials by bomb calorimetry and microscale com-
bustion calorimetry (Method B).
Sample Heat of Combustion:
Bomb calorimetry
/kJ g−1
Heat of Combustion:
Microscale combustion calorimetry
/kJ g−1
ACM_PE1 46.2 43.6
ACM_PE2 46.5 43.0
ACM_FR1 13.8 12.4
ACM_FR2 14.2 11.8
ACM_FR3 13.9 12.8
ACM_NC1 3.4 2.2
ACM_NC2 * 5.2
HPL_PF 21.3 19.3
HPL_FR 19.8 18.2
MWB_1 4.2 3.8
MWB_2 2.8 3.3
PF1 27.2 18.2
PF2 26.3 17.7
PF3 27.2 16.4
PIR1 28.1 21.9
PIR2 31.4 18.3
PIR3 29.8 23.7
SW ** 1.56
GW 2.43 1.95
* Corrugated aluminium could not be tested by bomb calorimetry as the
metal oxidised too vigorously.
** A positive value of the heat of combustion could not be obtained from the
stone wool sample, suggesting a very low binder content.
Fig. 2. Heat release of panel ﬁlling material by MCC Method A.
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the paint ﬁnish for ACM_NC1 and NC2 and MWB_1 and MWB_2. High,
sharp peaks of heat release rate were observed for ACM_PE1 and
ACM_PE2, reaching a maximum of 1300 and 1050 kW m−2 at 190 and
250 s respectively. Moreover, ACM_PE1 and ACM_FR1, both from the
same manufacturer, showed a notably earlier time to ignition than their
competitor panels. Given this similarity of the TGA curves for these
ﬁllings, this suggests a thicker or more easily ignited paint layer, or a
diﬀerence in absorptivity of radiant heat after the paint layers were
burnt oﬀ. Almost no residue remained between the aluminium plates
after the test for PE1 and PE2. The ACM_FRs underwent sustained
ﬂaming, but with a signiﬁcantly lower HRR. It is clear that the com-
bination of the protective aluminium sheets, and the metal hydroxide
ﬁre retardant at around 65% loading eﬀectively reduces the ﬂamm-
ability under these conditions. The Al(OH)3 of ACM_FR2 is notably less
eﬀective than the Mg(OH)2 of ACM_FR1 and ACM_FR3 at similar
loadings.
3.2.2. Insulation
All the insulation foams show very rapid ignition and early peak
HRR. However, the highest peaks are an order of magnitude less than
those of the ACM_PE. Fig. 5 shows clear diﬀerences between the
burning behaviour of PIR and phenolic foams. The PIRs show a higher
initial peak HRR and lower steady burning rate, after formation of a
protective char layer; the phenolic foams show a lower initial peak HRR
but a higher steady burning rate. PIR2 was cut just below the glass wool
layer; PIR2* was cut just above the glass wool layer to investigate its
eﬀect on the burning behaviour. This shows a slightly lower ﬁrst peak
HRR, but surprisingly, an enhanced second peak, at around 60 s A
summary table of the parameters measured by cone calorimetry and a
commentary on the data is provided in SM. A cone calorimetric study
[17] of three commercial PIR and one phenolic foam showed similar
results to those above, but highlighted the importance of the protective
char layer on the burning behaviour.
3.3. The eﬀect of ACM PIR combination
A qualitative experiment demonstrated the eﬀect of combining ACM
with PIR in a façade. A piece of ACM_PE (70× 70 mm2) was suspended
50mm above a block of PIR (100× 100×75mm3). Both products
were mounted with their faces vertical. The ACM was heated with a
small Bunsen ﬂame until drips of the molten PE ignited. These fell onto
the PIR and caused almost immediate ignition of the foam. The com-
bination of the burning foam and the dripping PE rapidly led to self-
sustaining combustion of the combination. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.
3.4. Bench-scale smoke toxicity
The SSTF yields are shown in Table 4. Each insulation product was
burnt under three ﬁre conditions, representing well-ventilated (ISO ﬁre
stage 2), small under-ventilated (3a) and large under-ventilated (3b).
Only insulation products were investigated. The smoke toxicity of ACM
ﬁllings, and the yield data for insulation is discussed further in SM.
The HCN yields for phenolic foam are low, corresponding to their
low nitrogen content, but increase with under-ventilation. The HCN
yields for the PIR are signiﬁcantly larger and increase by a factor of 2 to
4 in the transition from well-ventilated to under-ventilated.
The mineral wool insulation did not ignite, so its non-ﬂaming
combustion cannot be compared directly to the ﬂaming combustion of
the foams. However, they were tested under the three conditions used
here for the combustible materials for completeness. The yields are all
very low, as may be expected, and correspond to a small amount of
binder, as seen in TGA and MCC etc. An attempt [18] to use the con-
trolled atmosphere cone calorimeter [19] to assess the ﬁre behaviour of
PIR foam in under-ventilated conditions produced mixed results. As
expected, the mass-loss fell with decreasing oxygen concentration, but
surprisingly, the CO and HCN yields also fell, while the hydrocarbon
yields increased, showing that ﬂaming combustion was not the pre-
dominant gas phase process.
4. Discussion
Table 5 summarises the conclusions from the compositional analysis
of the outer-screen products and ﬁllings, based on manufacturer’s in-
formation, analytical data and the reasoning presented in SM. The in-
formation is necessary in order to interpret their ﬁre behaviour.
Fig. 3. Heat release of insulation materials by MCC Method A (note the use of
diﬀerent scales to Fig. 2).
Fig. 4. HRR of 70× 70 mm2 panels in the cone calorimeter at 50 kW m−2.
Fig. 5. HRR of insulation materials in the cone calorimeter at 50 kW m−2. Inset
shows early detail.
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The insulation materials are adequately described by the manu-
facturer’s generic descriptions in Table 2.
The thermal decomposition data (from TGA) presented in SM, show
good agreement with the micro-scale combustion data from MCC and
bomb calorimetry. For the ﬁllings, heat releases around 45, 13 and 3 kJ
g−1 and mass losses of 95, 50 and 15% at 700 °C in nitrogen or air were
found for the PE, FR and NC ﬁllings respectively. The dis-
proportionately higher mass losses for the FR materials correspond to
the presence of aluminium and magnesium hydroxides which dehy-
drate on heating. For the insulation materials, the heat release in the
bomb calorimeter is greater, mainly due to the more severe oxidation
conditions than in the MCC. However, signiﬁcantly less heat is released
by the glass or stone wool samples than the combustible foams.
4.1. Calculation of energy release
The heat release on complete combustion of the façade system has
been estimated from its chemical composition and literature values, and
from the measured values reported above. The façade system on the
Grenfell Tower consisted of 3mm PE sandwiched between two 0.5 mm
sheets of aluminium on the outer face, with 160mm of PIR insulation
on the external face of the concrete. Using literature values for the
density and heat of combustion of PE, PIR and aluminium respectively
of 0.95 g cm−3 and 43 kJ g-1; 0.0332 g cm−3 and 25 kJ g-1; and 2.7 g
cm−3 and 31 kJ g-1, the heat release per unit area of façade on complete
combustion of the PE is 123MJm-2, for PIR it is 132MJm-2, and for
aluminium it is 84MJm-2. Thus, on complete combustion, each square
metre of the façade system can contribute 255MJ (excluding alumi-
nium) to 339MJ (including aluminium) to the ﬁre. Photographs of the
burning Tower show falling sheets of aluminium and the debris at the
foot of the Tower is littered with pieces of aluminium sheet [10], so it
seems reasonable to conclude that the aluminium did not make a sig-
niﬁcant contribution to the heat release in situ.
In order to understand the burning behaviour of diﬀerent combi-
nations of building products, estimates of peak and total heat release
have been made from small-scale tests. Table 6 shows the contribution
to the heat release from each component of the façade system, as
measured in the current work, using data on physical properties from
Table 1 and 2, MCC,
Table 3, and cone calorimetry, Table S2, employing the approach
described above. All insulation was calculated as 100mm thick corre-
sponding to the government tests [12].
Fig. 6. Ignition of PIR by burning drips from
ACM_PE showing time after ﬁrst ﬂaming drip.
Table 4
SSTF yield data 1.
Sample ISO Fire Stage Mass loss % CO2 Yield g/g CO Yield g/g HCN Yield g/g HCl NO NO2 H3PO4
PF1 2 97.5 2.509 ± 0.049 0.023 ± 0.007 <0.001 0.001 ± 0.0001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3a 72.7 0.495 ± 0.016 0.320 ± 0.003 0.001± <0.0001 0.002 ± 0.0001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3b 72.3 0.630 ± 0.029 0.280 ± 0.033 0.001 ± 0.0001 0.007 ± 0.0006 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 ± 0.0002
PF2 2 98.1 2.094 ± 0.351 0.031 ± 0.007 <0.001 0.005 ± 0.0007 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3a 75.7 0.511 ± 0.019 0.282 ± 0.011 0.002 ± 0.0001 0.001 ± 0.0001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3b 73.7 0.638 ± 0.058 0.229 ± 0.028 0.005 ± 0.0008 0.004 ± 0.0006 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 ± 0.0003
PF3 2 95.7 2.529 ± 0.099 0.028 ± 0.022 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3a 66.1 0.473 ± 0.072 0.317 ± 0.006 0.003 ± 0.0002 0.001 ± 0.0001 <0.001 <0.001 0.003 ± 0.0002
3b 63.6 0.562 ± 0.187 0.223 ± 0.014 0.003 ± 0.0003 0.001 ± 0.0001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 ± 0.0001
PIR1 2 95.3 2.077 ± 0.045 0.106 ± 0.028 0.006 ± 0.0003 0.008 ± 0.0004 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3a 76.6 0.610 ± 0.040 0.217 ± 0.070 0.011 ± 0.0009 0.005 ± 0.0004 0.001 ± 0.0001 <0.001 <0.001
3b 78.9 0.554 ± 0.025 0.416 ± 0.048 0.015 ± 0.0008 0.003 ± 0.0002 0.002 ± 0.0001 <0.001 0.001 ± 0.0001
PIR2 2 92.0 2.376 ± 0.080 0.014 ± 0.007 0.004 ± 0.0001 0.013 ± 0.0004 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3a 75.9 0.447 ± 0.013 0.340 ± 0.031 0.017 ± 0.0010 0.006 ± 0.0003 0.003 ± 0.0002 <0.001 <0.001
3b 74.4 0.520 ± 0.061 0.341 ± 0.085 0.014 ± 0.0032 0.007 ± 0.0016 0.001 ± 0.0002 <0.001 <0.001
PIR3 2 94.4 2.375 ± 0.024 0.037 ± 0.014 0.004 ± 0.0002 0.019 ± 0.0011 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 ± 0.0001
3a 77.4 0.511 ± 0.054 0.331 ± 0.049 0.014 ± 0.0006 0.006 ± 0.0003 0.002 ± 0.0001 <0.001 0.001 ± 0.0001
3b 78.9 0.652 ± 0.056 0.249 ± 0.025 0.014 ± 0.0004 0.004 ± 0.0001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
SW* 2 – NF 1.77 0.027 ± 0.007 0.010 ± 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3a – NF 1.67 0.020 ± 0.006 0.009 ± 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3b – NF 1.64 0.051 ± 0.011 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
GW* 2 – NF 6.21 0.093 ± 0.018 0.018 ± 0.003 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3a – NF 8.63 0.144 ± 0.015 0.011 ± 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
3b – NF 12.7 0.189 ± 0.024 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
* Also tested at 900 °C but did not ignite; NF=not ﬂaming.
Table 5
Conclusions of screen product composition investigation.
Code Filling/Composition
ACM_PE1 LDPE (100%)
ACM_PE2 LDPE (100%)
ACM_FR1 LDPE with 65-70% Mg(OH)2
ACM_FR2 LDPE with 64-69% Al(OH)3
ACM_FR3 LDPE with 65-71% Mg(OH)2
ACM_NC1 LDPE (5%), Al(OH)3 (15%), Mg(OH)2 (33%), CaCO3 (45%)
ACM_NC2 Aluminium (86%), epoxy resin (14%)
HPL_PF Wood ﬁbre bound with phenol-formaldehyde resin
HPL_FR Fire retarded version of HPL_PF
MWB_1 Mineral ﬁbre and organic binder (16%)
MWB_2 Mineral ﬁbre and organic binder (9%)
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4.2. Correlation of micro- and bench-scale results to DCLG tests
In order to link the government test results [12] to the ﬁre beha-
viour observed in this study, the potential contribution to ﬂame spread
has been estimated, based on the data measured here. Two methodo-
logical approaches were used. The ﬁrst calculated the total energy re-
lease from the heat of combustion data, per m2 of façade, from MCC
method B data, and cone calorimetry. The second used the sum of the
pHRR from the products, in kW m−2 from cone calorimetry, since the
pHRR drives ﬁre growth [20]. Table 7 shows the potential heat release
by each component of the façade system used in the government
BS8414-1 tests. A critique of the BS 8414 standard, the BR 135 criteria,
and the DCLG tests has been reported elsewhere [21].
This very crude assessment is based on the large contribution to the
peak of heat release from the PE ﬂowing out of the ACM and the smaller
contribution to peak heat release rate from the burning insulation
material. The ACM_FR+PF of test 7 performed better than the ACM_FR
and PIR of test 3 inasmuch as the thermocouples recorded a 600 °C rise
for 30 s at 1530s, rather than 1220s, although the test criteria [22] only
consider temperatures exceeding 600 °C for the ﬁrst 15min (900 s) of
the test.
In the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower ﬁre, the test results for three
other cladding systems meeting the test criteria were made publicly
available: two use stone wool, one with ACM_FR, the other with
ACM_NC, for which our simple method predicts a pass. Another system
used ACM_FR with PF insulation, similar to that which failed in the
government tests due to “ﬂame spread above the test apparatus”. This
system has the lowest total peak HRR from cone calorimetry (212 kW
m−2) of those failing the government test. Thus, the use of total peak
HRR from cone calorimetry or MCC appears to be as good a predictor of
behaviour in rainscreen façade systems as the BS 8414-1 test. The cost
of these tests is around 0.01 of the large-scale tests.
No BS 8414-1 test reports appear to have been made publically
available for HPL screened systems, although they are widely used in
rainscreen systems on multi-storey residential buildings. Using the data
reported here, and the thresholds for passing the DCLG test, the per-
formance in the large-scale test of HPL_PF, HPL_FR and MWB1 and 2
outer-screens and diﬀerent insulation products is predicted in Table 8.
The intermediate values in Table 7 for heat of combustion in MCC,
100 kW m−2, cone calorimeter, 68 kW m−2, and peak HRR, 157 kW
m−2 have been used as pass/fail criteria.
It is apparent that none of the HPL_PF or HPL_FR screened systems
would be expected to pass using any of the three criteria, while con-
sistent predictions were not found from any of the MWB combinations,
except MWB1 with SW. Since the peak HRRs for MWB screens result
from burning paint, they are probably unrepresentative of the large-
scale test performance.
Thus, the diﬀerences in ﬁre behaviour between the combustible
materials and non-combustible materials are so great that they can
easily be quantiﬁed using tests costing hundreds of pounds or less, ra-
ther than the tens of thousands of pounds required to run a single BS
8414-1 test. In addition, the robustness of the bench-scale material tests
prevents misleading test results from being reported, based on opti-
mising the design of the façade system to pass the test, irrespective of
how representative it is of actual building façades. It is important to
note that the design and construction of the façade for the test is nor-
mally the responsibility of the product manufacturer, not the test la-
boratory. The Forum of Fire Testing Laboratories [23] proposed the use
of microscale decomposition and numerical models to replace large-
scale ﬁre tests, and thus eliminate these sorts of problems, over a
decade ago.
In a study sponsored by the insulation manufacturer, Kingspan,
Guillaume [24] argues that only the ﬁre performance of the whole fa-
çade need be considered, not the individual components. The tests used
a 2.4 m ACM rainscreen façade (following ISO 13785-1), ﬁtted with
cavity barriers, using a ﬁre source of 100 kW and a 2mm aluminium
protective L-proﬁle, and only the ACM made a signiﬁcant contribution
to the burning behaviour. However, the test claims to be a ⅓rd-scale
BS8414-1, while the ﬁre source is only 1/30th of BS8414-1, which does
not test the façade system adequately.
4.3. Smoke toxicity
As discussed in SM, the ﬁre condition and hence the toxicity of
burning ACM ﬁllings on the side of a building is too diﬃcult to predict
from bench-scale experiments. The burning of the PIR and phenolic
foam behind the ACM on Grenfell Tower would almost certainly have
been under-ventilated (uv) between ﬁre stages 3a and 3b. Fig. 7 shows
the relative contribution to incapacitation of HCN and CO from burning
1 kg of insulation material after 5min exposure under the stated ﬁre
Table 6
Potential heat release from each component of the façade system.
Sample Cone calorimeter data MCC data
Peak HRR
/kW m−2
Total heat release
/MJ m−2
Total heat release /MJ m−2
ACM_PE1 1364 105.4 124
ACM_PE2 1123 106.6 119
ACM_FR1 123 59.6 60
ACM_FR2 195 70.9 58
ACM_FR3 144 65.07 61
ACM_NC1 13.8 2.57 11
ACM_NC2 30.2 0.87 17
HPL_PF 530 172.71 260
HPL_FR 263 67.49 196
MWB_1 150 37.03 36
MWB_2 194 27.75 38
PF1 63.7 18.71 78
PF2 62.0 17.56 74
PF3 64.8 19.67 74
PIR1 116 13.33 71
PIR2 106 15.6 64
PIR3 107 14.5 83
SW 5.6 0.06 9
GW 8.7 0.67 7
Table 7
Predicted behaviour of combinations of façade components, and comparison with government test results [12], in order of ﬁre performance.
Test number Products in test UK government test result
(BS8414-1)
Σ(Heat of combustion per unit area)
MCC method B
/ kW m−2
Σ(Heat of combustion per unit area)
cone calorimeter
/ kW m−2
Σ(Peak Heat Release Rate) cone
calorimeter
/ kW m−2
1 ACM PE+PIR Test stopped (9min) 188 121 1471
2 ACM PE+SW Test stopped (7min) 134 105 1370
3 ACM FR+PIR Test stopped (25min) 125 75 230
7 ACM FR+PF Test stopped (28min) 134 77 185
4 ACM FR+SW Test passed 70 60 129
5 ACM NC+PIR Test passed 75 18 120
6 ACM NC+SW Test passed 20 3 19
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condition with the eﬄuent dispersed over a volume of 50 m3 (a large
room or small apartment) based on ISO 13571. Burning this amount of
phenolic foam in uv conditions is predicted to cause incapacitation to
somewhat less than 50% of the exposed population, as the FED is less
than one. However, burning this amount of any of the three PIR foams
used in this study would exceed the threshold for incapacitation by a
factor of between 2 and 4 in uv conditions. The higher toxicity of PIR
results from the presence of nitrogen in the polymer, which forms HCN
on burning, particularly in uv conditions. Once incapacitation has oc-
curred (in this case HCN causes loss of consciousness), the victim can no
longer eﬀect of their own escape, and unless rescued, will continue to
uptake CO and HCN until breathing ceases.
Fig. 8 shows the prediction of lethality from the same eﬄuents. This
shows a similar trend to that of incapacitation in Fig. 7, but the relative
contribution of HCN to CO is reduced. However, HCN still makes a
signiﬁcant contribution to the toxicity of the eﬄuents from all the
foams, far exceeding the toxicity from CO for under-ventilated burning
of the PIR foams. The FED for lethality is calculated from ISO 13,344,
based on a 30min exposure time. The low levels of binder in SW and
GW generate correspondingly low levels of asphyxiants, and low toxi-
city. Coupled with their inability to propagate combustion, this shows
why they are a safe alternative to combustible insulation. The material-
IC50 and material-LC50 values discussed in SM and shown in Table S4
provide the most direct route to estimating a safe loading of insulation
material.
4.4. The extent of the ACM problem
The government has established that there are 478 residential
buildings over 18m with ACM cladding [15] in England. 150 are in
private ownership and are believed to be non-compliant, but fuller data
is unavailable. Fig. 9 shows that for the remaining 328, 85% have
ACM_PE combined with combustible foam (29%), mineral wool (34%)
and unknown (23%). A minority (14%) have ACM_FR with diﬀerent
types of insulation, but none have ACM with a non-combustible core
(ACM_NC).
Of the 328 buildings for which data is available, 316 do not comply
with the UK Building Regulations. Of the non-compliant buildings, half
are social housing (50%) with the remainder divided between student
residences, and other public and private buildings, Fig. 10.
A consultation document on the future of desktop studies (described
in SM) showed that the government expected around 600 tall buildings
per year to have combustible facades [25]. This includes buildings with
rainscreen (or ventilated) façades clad with HPL etc., and External
Thermal Insulation Composite Systems (ETICS) type façades, where a
lightweight cement render covers the combustible insulation. Since
combustible building exteriors have been permitted since 2006, if they
became established building practice 10 years ago, this estimate sug-
gests there could be as many as 6000 buildings over 18m in England
with combustible façades.
5. Conclusions
In the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower tragedy there are a number of
unanswered questions. This study came about because of the lack of
published information relating to the composition, decomposition and
ﬁre behaviour of available façade products, and the dependence on
controversial large-scale tests. This paper provides that crucial in-
formation, and demonstrates its relationship to large-scale test perfor-
mance. Moreover, the data show good consistency between scales and
diﬀerent decomposition conditions. It highlights large diﬀerences in ﬁre
behaviour between diﬀerent products, both for outer-screens and
Table 8
Predicted behaviour of combinations of façade with HPL panels.
Products in test Σ(Heat of combustion per unit area)
MCC method B
/ kW m−2
Pass/Fail
(Pass
< 100)
Σ(Heat of combustion per unit area)
cone calorimeter
/ kW m−2
Pass/Fail
(Pass
< 68)
Σ(Peak Heat Release Rate) cone
calorimeter
/ kW m−2
Pass/Fail
(Pass <
157)
HPL_PF+PIR 324 ✗ 188 ✗ 636 ✗
HPL_PF+ SW 270 ✗ 173 ✗ 535 ✗
HPL_PF+PF 334 ✗ 190 ✗ 592 ✗
HPL_FR+PIR 261 ✗ 83 ✗ 370 ✗
HPL_FR+ SW 206 ✗ 68 ✗ 269 ✗
HPL_FR+PF 270 ✗ 85 ✗ 325 ✗
MWB1 + PIR 101 ✗ 53 ✓ 256 ✗
MWB1 + SW 46 ✓ 37 ✓ 155 ✓
MWB1 + PF 110 ✗ 55 ✓ 212 ✗
MWB2 + PIR 102 ✗ 43 ✓ 300 ✗
MWB2 + SW 47 ✓ 28 ✓ 199 ✗
MWB2 + PF 112 ✗ 45 ✓ 256 ✗
Fig. 7. FED for incapacitation following 5min exposure from burning 1 kg with the eﬄuent dispersed in a volume of 50 m3.
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insulation boards.
By comparing similar products of the same generic type (e.g.
ACM_FR, or PIR) it shows that there is little diﬀerence in the decom-
position and burning behaviour for that product type, and also in the
case of the insulation materials, in the smoke toxicity.
The bench-scale burning behaviour shows the most dramatic dif-
ferences between the ACM_PE and the ACM_FR and ACM_NC materials.
This illustrates clearly how ACM_PE contributes to very rapid ﬁre
spread when used to clad the exterior of a building. It also identiﬁes a
potential problem with HPL_PF. The bench-scale burning behaviour of
the PIR and PF shows the contrasting eﬀect of the more resilient char on
the PIR (higher initial peak followed by lower HRR) compared to the PF
(lower peak HRR but a higher steady HRR). This diﬀerence is demon-
strated by the TGA in air, where the mass loss rate of the PIR is initially
higher, but around 450 °C the PF overtakes it. The lack of heat release
from the stone and glass wool materials is expected, but is crucially
important in understanding how to prevent further tragedies,
demonstrating the existence of alternative non-combustible insulation
materials.
In the under-ventilated conditions of ﬂaming within the cavity, the
smoke toxicity data show a factor of 3 increase for PIR, compared to PF.
The non-combustible GW and SW products show smoke toxicity lower
than the PIR by a factor of around 15. Again, these results have very
clear implications for those selecting products to ensure the ﬁre safety
of occupants.
The simple additive models of total heat release and peak HRR
underline the eﬀects of large diﬀerences in ﬁre behaviour, and allow
elimination of the most dangerous combinations from façades. In con-
trast, the qualitative demonstration of PIR ignition by ﬂaming drips of
PE from ACM serves as a warning to treat systems as a whole, rather
than the sum of their individual parts, since one component can interact
synergistically or antagonistically with any other. The evidence pre-
sented in this paper challenges the statements such as “the test results
with regard to heat release rates, smoke and toxic gas emissions show
that the organic polyisocyanurate insulation and the mineral ﬁbre in-
sulation behave similarly during the ﬁre” made by the combustible
foam industry [26], that their insulation products do not constitute a
safety hazard
If the data in this paper had been readily available, it may have
contributed to the prohibition of combustible materials on the outside
of tall buildings, as they are in most of Europe, and this tragedy could
not have occurred. In the UK, the building ﬁre regulations have just
been modiﬁed to ban the use of combustible materials on the outside of
tall buildings (November 2018) [27].
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